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Abstract
One of the central issues in the hidden subgroup problem is to bound the sample complexity, i.e., the
number of identical samples of coset states sufficient and necessary to solve the problem. In this paper, we
present general bounds for the sample complexity of the identification and decision versions of the hidden
subgroup problem. As a consequence of the bounds, we show that the sample complexity for both of the
decision and identification versions isΘ(log |H|/ log p) for a candidate setH of hidden subgroups in the case
that the candidate subgroups have the same prime order p, which implies that the decision version is at least
as hard as the identification version in this case. In particular, it does so for the important instances such as
the dihedral and the symmetric hidden subgroup problems. Moreover, the upper bound of the identification
is attained by the pretty good measurement. This shows that the pretty good measurement can identify any
hidden subgroup of an arbitrary group with at most O(log |H|) samples.
1 Introduction
1.1 Background
The hidden subgroup problem is one of the central issues in quantum computation, which was introduced for
revealing the structure behind exponential speedups in quantum computation [34].
Definition 1.1 (Hidden Subgroup Problem (HSP)) Let G be a finite group. For a hidden subgroup H ≤ G,
we define a map fH from G to a finite set S with the property that fH(g) = fH(gh) if and only if h ∈ H. Given
fH : G → S and a generator set of G, the hidden subgroup problem (HSP) is the problem of finding a set of
generators for the hidden subgroup H. We say that HSP over G is efficiently solvable if we can construct an
algorithm in time polynomial in log |G|.
The nature of many existing quantum algorithms relies on efficient solutions to Abelian HSPs (i.e., HSPs over
Abelian groups) [41, 28, 5, 6]. In particular, Shor’s cerebrated quantum algorithms for factoring and discrete
logarithm essentially consist of reductions to certain Abelian HSPs and efficient solutions to the Abelian HSPs
[40]. Besides his results, many efficient quantum algorithms for important number-theoretic problems (e.g.,
Pell’s equation [15] and unit group of a number field [16, 38]) were based on solutions to Abelian HSPs.
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Recently, non-Abelian HSPs have also received much attention. It is well known that the graph isomor-
phism problem can be reduced to the HSP over the symmetric group [5, 3] (more strictly, the HSP over S n ≀ S 2
[8]). Regev showed that we can construct an efficient quantum algorithm for the unique shortest vector prob-
lem if we find an efficient solution to HSP over the dihedral group under certain conditions [36]. While the
efficient quantum algorithm for general Abelian HSPs has been already given [28, 34], the non-Abelian HSPs
are extremely harder than the Abelian ones. There actually exist efficient quantum algorithms for HSPs over
several special classes of non-Abelian groups [37, 11, 18, 12, 14, 23, 24, 30, 2]. Nonetheless, most of important
cases of non-Abelian HSPs, including the dihedral and symmetric HSPs, are not known to have efficient solu-
tions. Thus, finding efficient algorithms for non-Abelian HSPs is one of the most challenging issues in quantum
computation.
The main approach to the non-Abelian HSPs is based on a generic framework called the standard method.
To our best knowledge, all the existing quantum algorithms for HSPs essentially contain this framework. The
standard method essentially reduces HSPs to the quantum state identification[39] for the so-called coset states,
which contain information of the hidden subgroup.
Definition 1.2 (Coset State and Standard Method) Let G be any finite group and H be the hidden subgroup
of G. We then define the coset state ρH for H as ρH = 1|G|
∑
g∈G |gH〉〈gH| = |H||G|
∑
g∈G/H |gH〉〈gH|, where
|gH〉 = 1√|H|
∑
h∈H |gh〉.
Standard Method with k Coset States
(1) Prepare two registers with a uniform superposition over G in the first register and all zeros in the second
register: 1√|G|
∑
g∈G |g〉|0〉.
(2) Compute fH(g) and store the result to the second register: 1√|G|
∑
g∈G |g〉| fH(g)〉.
(3) Discard the second register to obtain a coset state: ρH = |H||G|
∑
g∈G/H |gH〉〈gH|.
(4) Repeat (1)–(3) k times and then apply a quantum measurement to k samples of ρH .
Thus the main task for solving HSP based on the standard method is to find an efficiently implementable
quantum measurement extracting the information of the hidden subgroup from identical samples of the coset
state.
Many researchers have broadly studied hard instances of non-Abelian HSPs from positive and negative
aspects based on the standard method. In particular, they have focused on the sample complexity of HSPs,
i.e., how many coset states are sufficient and necessary to identify the hidden subgroup with a constant success
probability.
In several classes of the non-Abelian HSPs for which efficient algorithms are unknown, it is shown that we
can identify any hidden subgroup by (possibly inefficient) classical post-processes using the classical informa-
tion obtained by the quantum Fourier transforms to polynomially many samples of coset states [9, 18, 14, 30].
Bacon, Childs and van Dam demonstrated that the so-called pretty good measurement (PGM, also known as
the squire root measurement or least squares measurement [20]) is optimal for identifying coset states in view
of the sample complexity on a class of semidirect product groups A⋊Zp including the dihedral group, where A is
any Abelian group and p is a prime [2]. They proved that the sample complexity is Θ(log |A|/ log p) to identify
the hidden subgroup by the PGM from the candidate set HSDP = {〈(a, 1)〉 < A⋊Zp : a ∈ A}. Moore and Russell
generalized their result to prove the optimality of the PGM for a wider class of HSPs [31]. They actually gave
the PGM for identifying coset states of hidden conjugates of a subgroup, i.e., hidden subgroups having form of
g−1Hg for a fixed non-normal subgroup H of a finite group G and g ∈ G. These results of [2, 31] showed that
the PGM succeeds for a wide class of HSPs with at most O(log |H|) samples for the candidate set H of hidden
subgroups. For a more general case, Ettinger, Høyer and Knill gave a bounded-error quantum measurement
that solves HSP over any finite group G with O(log2 |G|) samples of coset states (Theorem 2 in [10]). They also
constructed an error-free measurement for the general HSP with the same sample complexity O(log2 |G|) within
a constant factor in [10] by combining the bounded-error one with the amplitude amplification technique [7].
These quantum measurements ignore the time complexity issue in general. However, they may lead to
efficient quantum algorithms for HSPs. Bacon et al. actually gave efficient implementation of the PGM for
identifying given coset states on a class of the semidirect groups including the Heisenberg group [2], i.e., they
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constructed an efficient quantum algorithm for the HSPs from the corresponding PGMs. Hence, to give the
quantum measurements for identification of given coset states like PGMs may play important roles towards the
construction of efficient quantum algorithms for HSPs.
The negative results of the standard method has also been studied from an information-theoretic viewpoint,
which are based on a decision version of the HSP defined as the problem of deciding whether the hidden
subgroup is trivial or not. In particular, the difficulty of the HSP over the symmetric group S n has been shown
by a number of results for this decision version [18, 14, 27, 33, 32]. Hallgren et al. recently proved that a joint
measurement across multiple samples of coset states is essentially required to solve a decision version over
the symmetric group, which is deeply related to the graph isomorphism problem. More precisely, they showed
that joint quantum measurements across Ω(n log n) samples of coset states are necessary to decide whether the
given samples are generated from the trivial subgroup {id} or a subgroup in HSym = {H < S n : H = 〈h〉, h2 =
id, h(i) , i (i = 1, ..., n)}, i.e., a set of all the subgroups generated by the involution composed of n/2 disjoint
transpositions [17].
1.2 Our Contributions
We study upper and lower bounds for the sample complexity of general HSPs from an information-theoretic
viewpoint. We consider two problems associated with HSPs to deal with their sample complexity. The first one
is the identification version for solving HSPs based on the standard method.
Definition 1.3 (Coset State Identification (CSI)) Let H be a set of candidate subgroups of a finite group G.
We then define SH as a set of coset states corresponding to H . Given a black box that generates an unknown
coset state ρH in SH , the Coset State Identification (CSI) for H is the problem of identifying H ∈ H .
One can easily see that any solution to HSP based on the standard method reduces this identification of coset
states. We now define the sample complexity of CSI for H as the sufficient and necessary number of samples
for identifying the given coset state with a constant probability.
The second one is the decision version, named the Triviality of Coset State. Special cases of this problem
have been discussed for the limitations of the standard method in many previous results [18, 14, 27, 32, 33, 1,
17].
Definition 1.4 (Triviality of Coset State (TCS)) Let H be a set of candidate non-trivial subgroups of a finite
group G, i.e., H , {id} for every H ∈ H . We then define SH as a set of coset states corresponding to H .
Given a black box that generates an unknown state σ that is either in SH (i.e., a coset state for the non-trivial
subgroup) or equal to I/|G| (i.e., a coset state for the trivial subgroup), the Triviality of Coset State for SH is
the problem of deciding whether σ is in SH or equal to I/|G|. We say that a quantum algorithm solves TCS
with a constant advantage if it correctly decides whether a given state is in SH or equal to I/|G| with success
probability at least 1/2 + δ for some constant δ ∈ (0, 1/2].
Similarly to the case of CSI, we define the sample complexity of TCS for H as the sufficient and necessary
number of coset states to solve TCS with a constant advantage.
Note that this problem might be efficiently solvable even if we cannot identify the hidden subgroup. Ac-
tually, if we can give a solution to TCS for HSym = {H < S n : H = 〈h〉, h2 = id, h(i) , i (i = 1, ..., n)}, we
can also solve the rigid graph isomorphism problem, i.e., the problem of finding an isomorphism between two
graphs having no non-trivial automorphisms, and the decisional graph automorphism problem, i.e., the problem
of deciding whether a given graph has non-trivial automorphisms or not [29].
In this paper, we give bounds of the sample complexity of CSI and TCS by simple information-theoretic
arguments. We present the following bounds of the sample complexity of CSI.
Theorem 1.5 (Upper and Lower Bounds for CSI) LetH be any set of candidate subgroups of a finite group.
Then, the sample complexity of CSI for H is at most O
( log |H|
log minH,H′∈H (|H|/|H∩H′ |)
)
and at least Ω
( log |H|
log maxH∈H |H|
)
.
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Moreover, the upper bound of CSI can be attained by the PGM. This shows that we can identify a hidden
subgroup for an arbitrary group G by the PGM with at most O(log |H|) samples, which is a wider class than
those of the previous results [2, 31]. It is noted that the essentially same upper bound∗ for CSI follows from the
result of Ettinger et al. [10]. However, their measurement is not known to be a pretty good measurement.
We also present the following bounds of the sample complexity of TCS.
Theorem 1.6 (Upper and Lower Bounds for TCS) Let H be any set of candidate subgroups of a finite
group. Then, the sample complexity of TCS for H is at most O
( log |H|
log minH∈H |H|
)
. If |H| is a prime for every
H ∈ H , the sample complexity is at least Ω
( log |H|
log maxH∈H |H|
)
.
Summarizing these bounds, we obtain the following tight bounds for a class of CSI and TCS including
several important instances such as HSDP and HSym.
Corollary 1.7 Let H be any set of candidate subgroups of a finite group satisfying that |H| = p for every
H ∈ H , where p is a prime. Then, the sample complexity of CSI and TCS for H is Θ
( log |H|
log p
)
.
This theorem implies that the decision version is as hard as the corresponding identification version in view of
the sample complexity for this class.
We moreover apply our arguments to evaluation of information-theoretic security of the quantum encryp-
tion schemes proposed by Kawachi et al. [25, 26]. They proposed two quantum encryption schemes: One is
a single-bit encryption scheme, which has a computational security proof based on the worst-case hardness
of the decisional graph automorphism problem, and the other is a multi-bit encryption scheme, which has no
security proof. Since their schemes make use of quantum states quite similar to coset states over the symmetric
group as the encryption keys and ciphertexts, our proof techniques are applicable to the security evaluation of
their schemes. We prove that the success probability of any computationally unbounded adversary distinguish-
ing between any two ciphertexts is at most 12 + 2
−Ω(n) in their log m-bit encryption scheme with the security
parameter n if the adversary has only o
(
n log n
m log m
)
encryption keys.
2 Information-Theoretic Bounds
In this section, we present the general bounds for CSI and TCS. We first introduce basic notions and useful
lemmas for our proofs in Section 2.1. We then give the general upper bounds for CSI and TCS in Section 2.2.
We also prove the general lower bounds for the sample complexity of CSI and TCS in Section 2.3.
2.1 Basic Notions and Useful Lemmas
Any quantum operations for extracting classical information from quantum states can be generally described
by the positive operator-valued measure (POVM) [35, 21]. A POVM M = {Mi}i∈S associated with a set of
outcomes S is a set of Hermitian matrices satisfying that Mi ≥ 0 (i ∈ S ) and ∑i∈S Mi = I. Then the probability
of obtaining outcome k ∈ S by the POVM M from a quantum state ρ is given by tr(Mkρ).
The trace norm of a matrix X ∈ Cd×d is useful to estimate success probability of quantum state distinction
for two states, and is defined as ‖X‖tr = max‖Y‖≤1〈Y, X〉 = tr
√
X†X, where ‖Y‖ is the l2-norm of a matrix Y and
〈Y, X〉 = trY†X is the matrix inner product. It is well known that for any two quantum states ρ0 and ρ1 the average
success probability of the optimal POVM distinguishing between two quantum states is equal to 12+
1
4‖ρ0−ρ1‖tr,
i.e., 12 maxM={M0 ,M1}(trM0ρ0 + trM1ρ1) = 12 + 14‖ρ0 − ρ1‖tr. See [4] for more details on the matrix analysis and
[35, 21] on basics of the quantum information theory.
We make use of the PGM in order to prove the general upper bound for CSI. The following lemma shown
by Hayashi and Nagaoka [22] is useful to estimate the error probability of the pretty good measurement. (See
also Lemma 4.5 in [21].)
∗Strictly speaking, our bound is better than theirs up to a constant factor.
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Lemma 2.1 (Hayashi and Nagaoka [22]) For any Hermitian matrices S and T satisfying that I ≥ S ≥ 0 and
T ≥ 0, it holds that I − √S + T−1S √S + T−1 ≤ 2(I − S ) + 4T , where √S + T−1 is the generalized inverse
matrix of
√
S + T .
In our several proofs, we need to calculate the rank of a coset state. The following lemma gives the estima-
tion of the rank.
Lemma 2.2 For any coset state for a subgroup H of a finite group G, it holds that rank(ρH) = |G||H| .
Proof. Let |ψ〉 be a purification of ρH described as |ψ〉 = 1√|G|
∑
g∈G |g〉A| fH(g)〉B,where fH is the given function
in the definition of HSP. Tracing out the register A, we have rank(trA|ψ〉〈ψ|) = |G/H|. Since rank (trA|ψ〉〈ψ|) =
rank (trB|ψ〉〈ψ|), we obtain rank(ρH) = |G||H| . 
2.2 Lower Bounds
We next prove the key theorem on lower bounds for CSI by a simple information-theoretic argument. This the-
orem generally gives the necessary number of identical samples of an unknown coset state for the identification.
Theorem 2.3 Let H be any set of candidate subgroups of a finite group G. Then, the sample complexity of
CSI for H is at least Ω
( log |H|
log maxH∈H |H|
)
.
Proof. Let M = {MH}H∈H be any POVM associated with SH using k samples of the coset state. By using
the fact that |〈X, Y〉| ≤ ‖X‖‖Y‖tr for any matrices X, Y ∈ Cd×d, the probability of M obtaining correct outcome is
upper bounded by
1
|H|
∑
H∈H
trMHρ⊗kH =
1
|H|
∑
H∈H
〈MH, ρ⊗kH 〉
≤ 1|H|
∑
H∈H
∥∥∥ρ⊗kH ∥∥∥ ‖MH‖tr = 1|H|
∑
H∈H
∥∥∥ρ⊗kH ∥∥∥ tr
(√
M†H MH
)
=
1
|H|
∑
H∈H
∥∥∥ρ⊗kH ∥∥∥ trMH
≤ 1|H| maxH∈H ‖ρH‖
k
∑
H∈H
trMH =
1
|H| maxH∈H ‖ρH‖
ktr
∑
H∈H
MH
 = (maxH∈H ‖ρH‖|G|)k|H| .
Thus, the success probability of any quantum algorithm that solves CSI with k coset states is upper bounded by
(maxH∈H ‖ρH‖|G|)k
|H| . Since the coset state ρH =
1
|G/H|
∑
g∈G/H |gH〉〈gH| for any subgroup H is a uniform summation
of the matrices |gH〉〈gH| orthogonal to each other, we obtain ‖ρH‖ = 1/rank(ρH). It follows that ‖ρH‖ = |H|/|G|
by Lemma 2.2. The success probability is thus at most (maxH∈H |H|)
k
|H| , which implies that any quantum algorithm
that solves CSI for H requires Ω
( log |H|
log maxH∈H |H|
)
coset states in order to attain constant success probability. 
As mentioned in Section 1, we do not have to identify a hidden subgroup to solve TCS. Thus, we cannot
expect the same technique as the proof of the lower bound for CSI to work for that of TCS. We give another
proof technique to obtain the lower bound for TCS.
Theorem 2.4 Let H be any set of candidate subgroups of a finite group G. The sample complexity of TCS
for H is at least Ω
( log |H|
log(maxH∈H |H|)
)
if |H| is a prime for every H ∈ H .
Proof. We first show that the success probability of solving TCS for H is upper bounded by that of iden-
tification for certain two quantum states. Let M = {M0, M1} be any POVM associated with {{id},H}. The
success probability of M is given by min{trM0(I/|G|)⊗k,minρH∈SH {trM1ρ⊗kH }}. Also, it holds by the linearity
of the trace and the POVM that trM1
(
1
|H|
∑
ρH∈SH ρ
⊗k
H
)
= 1|H|
∑
ρH∈SH trM1ρ
⊗k
H ≥ minρH∈SH trM1ρ⊗kH , Thus, the
success probability is at most min{trM0(I/|G|)⊗k, 1|H|
∑
ρH∈SH trM1ρ
⊗k
H }. This is equal to the success probability
of the identification for (I/|G|)⊗k and 1|H|
∑
ρH∈SH ρ
⊗k
H .
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Note that we cannot apply the argument of Theorem 2.3 to the identification. Instead, we directly evaluate
an upper bound of the trace norm of the matrix X = 1|H|
∑
ρH∈SH ρ
⊗k
H − (I/|G|)⊗k. Then the success probability of
the identification is at most 12 +
1
4‖X‖tr by the property of the trace norm. Naı¨vely expanding X, we obtain by
the triangle inequality
‖X‖tr =
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
|H|
∑
H∈H
1
|G|k
∑
g1,...,gk∈G
 ∑
h1,...,hk∈H
|g1, ..., gk〉〈g1h1, ..., gkhk | − |g1, ..., gk〉〈g1, ..., gk |

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
tr
=
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
|H|
1
|G|k
∑
g1 ,...,gk∈G

∑
H∈H
∑
h1 ,...,hk∈H(h1,...,hk),(id,...,id)
|g1, ..., gk〉〈g1h1, ..., gkhk |

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
tr
≤ 1|H||G|k
∑
g1,...,gk∈G
‖|g1, ..., gk〉‖
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
H∈H
∑
h1 ,...,hk∈H(h1 ,...,hk),(id,...,id)
〈g1h1, ..., gkhk |
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
=
1
|H|
√√
∑
H,H′∈H
|H ∩ H′|k
 − |H|2 =
√√
1
|H|2
∑
H∈H
|H|k +
∑
H,H′
|H ∩ H′|k
 − 1
≤
√
maxH∈H |H|k
|H| .
In the last inequality, we use the fact that |H ∩ H′| = 1 for any distinct H and H′, which follows from the prime
order of the subgroups.
In order to have this trace norm larger than some positive constant, k must be Ω
( log |H|
log(maxH∈H |H|)
)
. Thus
Ω
( log |H|
log(maxH∈H |H|)
)
samples are necessary for constant advantage. 
2.3 Upper Bounds
We present general upper bounds for CSI and TCS in this section. First, we prove the upper bound for CSI by
using the PGM for SH . In this proof, we make use of Lemma 2.1 to estimate the error probability of the PGM.
Theorem 2.5 Let H be any set of candidate subgroups of a finite group G. Then, the sample complexity of
CSI for H is at most O
( log |H|
log minH,H′∈H (|H|/|H∩H′|)
)
.
Proof. Let PH be the projection onto the space spanned by supp(ρH) for H ∈ H . We consider the pretty good
measurement M = {Σ−1/2PHΣ−1/2}H∈H for SH , where Σ =
∑
H∈H PH . Let γH,H′ = |{(h, h′) ∈ H × H′ : hh′ =
id}| = |H ∩ H′| for H,H′ ∈ H . We now prove that the error probability of M is at most 4∑H′,H (γH,H′ )k|H′|k if the
given state is ρH .
Since we have
trρHρH′ =
1
|G|2
∑
g,g′∈G
∑
h∈H,h′∈H′
tr|g〉〈gh||g′〉〈g′h′| = 1|G|2
∑
g∈G
∑
h∈H,h′∈H′
tr|g〉〈ghh′ | = 1|G|2
∑
g∈G
∑
h∈H,h′∈H′
hh′=id
1 =
γH,H′
|G| ,
it follows that trPHρH′ =
γH,H′
|G|
|G|
|H′ | =
γH,H′
|H′ | . Setting S = P
⊗k
H and T =
∑
H′,H P⊗kH′ in Lemma 2.1, if the given state
is ρH , the error probability of M is
tr(I − Σ−1/2P⊗kH Σ−1/2)ρ⊗kH ≤ 2tr(I − P⊗kH )ρ⊗kH + 4tr
 ∑
H′,H
P⊗kH′
 ρ⊗kH = 4 ∑
H′,H
(trPH′ρH)k = 4
∑
H′,H
(γH,H′)k
|H′|k .
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We can easily obtain the upper bound of the error probability from the above estimation. Since we have
4 max
H∈H
∑
H′,H
(γH,H′)k
|H′|k ≤ 4|H| maxH,H′∈H
( |H ∩ H′|
|H|
)k
,
the error probability of M is at most 4|H|maxH,H′∈H
( |H∩H′|
|H|
)k
, which implies that O
( log |H|
log minH,H′∈H (|H|/|H∩H′ |)
)
samples of coset states are sufficient for constant success probability. 
Next, we present the general upper bound for TCS as follows. This upper bound can be attained by a simple
two-valued POVM.
Theorem 2.6 Let H be any set of candidate subgroups of a finite group G. Then the sample complexity of
TCS for H is at most O
( log |H|
log minH∈H |H|
)
.
Proof. We consider a projection T onto the space spanned by ⋃H∈H supp(ρ⊗kH ). It obviously holds that
trTρ⊗kH = 1 for every H ∈ H . On the other hand, the error probability is given by trT (I/|G|)⊗k. Then we have
trT (I/|G|)⊗k = rank(T )|G|k ≤
∑
H∈H rank(ρH )k
|G|k . Since rank(ρH) = |G|/|H| by Lemma 2.2, we obtain
∑
H∈H rank(ρH )k
|G|k =∑
H∈H (|G|/|H|)k
|G|k ≤
|H|
minH∈H |H|k . This implies that at most O
( log |H|
log minH∈H |H|
)
samples of coset states are sufficient for
constant advantage. 
3 Security Evaluation of Quantum Encryption Schemes
Our arguments are applicable not only to bounds for HSP but also to security evaluation of quantum crypto-
graphic schemes. In this section, we apply our arguments to evaluation of the information-theoretic security
of the quantum encryption schemes proposed in [25, 26]. As mentioned in Section 1, they proposed single-bit
and multi-bit quantum encryption schemes. While they gave the complexity-theoretic security to the single-bit
scheme under the assumption of the worst-case hardness of the decisional graph automorphism problem, the
multi-bit one has no security proof. Also, they have already proven in [26] that any computationally unbounded
quantum algorithm cannot solve a certain quantum state distinction problem that underlies the single-bit scheme
with few samples by reducing the solvability of their distinction problem to the result of [17]. On the other hand,
the security of their encryption schemes, as well as the underlying problem for their multi-bit scheme, are not
evaluated yet from a viewpoint of the quantum information theory.
Their schemes make use of certain quantum states for their encryption keys and ciphertexts. We now
call these quantum states encryption-key states and cipherstates, respectively. Since their multi-bit encryption
scheme contains the single-bit one as a special case if we ignore its efficiency and complexity-theoretic security,
we only discuss their multi-bit scheme in this paper.
We now describe their multi-bit encryption scheme in detail. Assume that the message length parameter m
divides the security parameter n, where m ∈ {2, ..., n}. Let Kmn = {h : h = (a1 · · · am) · · · (an−m+1 · · · an), ai ∈
{1, ..., n}, ai , a j (i , j)} ⊂ S n, i.e., a set of the permutations composed of n/m disjoint cyclic permutations,
which is used for the decryption key. In this scheme, we exploit the following quantum state for a message s:
ρ
(s)
h =
1
mn!
∑
g∈S n
(∑m−1
k=0 ω
ks
m |ghk〉
) (∑m−1
l=0 ω
−ls
m 〈ghl |
)
, where ωm = e2pii/m and h ∈ Kmn . Note that ρ(0)h is the coset
state for the hidden subgroup {id, h, ..., hm−1}.
We now refer to as (n,m)-QES their multi-bit encryption scheme with the security parameter n and the
message length parameter m. The protocol of (n,m)-QES is summarized as follows.
Protocol: (n,m)-QES
(1) The receiver Bob chooses his decryption key h uniformly at random from Kmn and generates the encryption-
key states σh = (ρ(0)h , ..., ρ(m−1)h ).
(2) The sender Alice requests the encryption-key state σh to Bob. She picks ρ(s)h up from σh as the cipherstate
corresponding to her classical message s ∈ {0, ...,m − 1} and then sends it to him.
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(3) Bob decrypts her cipherstate ρ(s)h with his decryption key h.
We assume the same adversary model except for Eve’s computational power as the original ones in [25, 26].
Note that the eavesdropper Eve can also request the same encryption-key states to Bob as one of senders. Eve in
advance requests the encryption-key states to Bob. When Alice sends to Bob her cipherstate that Eve wants to
eavesdrop, Eve picks up Alice’s cipherstate and then tries to extract Alice’s message from the cipherstate with
the encryption-key states by computationally unbounded quantum computer, i.e., Eve can apply an arbitrary
POVM over the cipherstates and encryption-key states to extract Alice’s message.
We consider a stronger security notion such that Eve cannot distinguish between even two candidates, i.e.,
she cannot find a non-negligible gap between trM1(ρ(s)h ⊗σ⊗kh ) and trM1(ρ(s
′)
h ⊗σ⊗kh ) even by the optimal POVM
M = {M0, M1} when Bob chooses h uniformly at random. This notion naturally extends the computational
indistinguishability of encryptions, which is the standard security notion in the modern cryptography [13], to
the information-theoretic one.
Since the gap is at most 12‖ 1|Kmn |
∑
h∈Kmn ρ
(s)
h ⊗ σ⊗kh − ρ
(s′)
h ⊗ σ⊗kh ‖tr, this notion can be formalized by the trace
norm between them. Then, we say that the cipherstates are information-theoretically indistinguishable within
k encryption-key states if ‖ 1|Kmn |
∑
h∈Kmn ρ
(s)
h ⊗ σ⊗kh − ρ
(s′)
h ⊗ σ⊗kh ‖tr = 2−Ω(n).
For this security notion, we can obtain the following theorem by our information-theoretic arguments. The
proof is almost straightforward by Theorem 2.4.
Theorem 3.1 The cipherstates of (n,m)-QES are information-theoretically indistinguishable within o
(
n log n
m log m
)
encryption-key states.
Proof. Let ls =
∥∥∥∥ 1|Kmn | ∑h∈Kmn ρ(s)h ⊗ σ⊗kh − (I/n!)⊗mk+1
∥∥∥∥
tr
. Then the trace norm between two state sequences
given in the definition of the information-theoretic indistinguishability is at most ls+ls′ by the triangle inequality.
Since the trace norm is invariant under unitary transformations, we can show that ls + ls′ = 2l0 by taking
appropriate unitary operators. Then we can prove that l0 ≤
√
mmk+1/|Kmn | by the argument of Theorem 2.4.
Since we have |Kmn | ≈ m
1/2nn−n/m
en−n/m by the standard counting method and the Stirling approximation, the trace norm
is at most 2−Ω(n) if k = o
(
n log n
m log m
)
. 
For example, when we set m = nε for any constant 0 < ε < 1, we obtain the ε log n-bit encryption scheme
whose cipherstates are information-theoretically indistinguishable within o(n1−ε) encryption-key states.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have shown general bounds for CSI and TCS, and an application to the security evaluation of
the quantum encryption schemes. We believe such an information-theoretic approach will help constructions
of efficient quantum algorithms for non-Abelian HSPs as in the case of [2]. After our preliminary version
of this paper, Harrow and Winter followed our approach to prove the existence of a quantum measurement
for identifying general quantum states and lower bounds of samples for the identification [19]. Their results
generalize and improve our bounds for CSI.
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